

MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE FIREARMS MANAGEMENT AUDIT

Bureau of Internal Oversight

Final Audit Report

Audit #A2015-0060

February 8, 2016

Bureau of Internal Oversight

Executive Summary

	To: Captain Dave Munley Commander Bureau of Internal Oversight	From: Connie Phillips Senior Auditor Bureau of Internal Oversight
	Audit #: A2015-0060 Final Report	Date: February 8, 2016

The loss of firearms by law enforcement agencies poses serious risks to the public, including the risks that missing firearms may be used to inflict bodily harm or to further criminal activity. A Bay Area investigation was opened after it was discovered that a gun used in a July 2015 shooting death was a gun that had been stolen from a Bureau of Land Management ranger in San Francisco. “[The] investigation uncovered hundreds of guns missing from Bay Area Law enforcement agencies, stolen from officers’ homes or vehicles, or simply unaccounted for.”¹

The investigation went on to say that in 2010, the San Jose Police Department conducted an audit of their firearms inventory and discovered that over 300 firearms were missing. Poor recordkeeping and weak inventory controls were to blame for the unaccounted for weapons. The majority of the missing weapons were handguns issued to officers; however, also missing were 6 sniper rifles, 2 M-16 rifles, 10 40mm launchers, and 49 shotguns. Only 16 have been recovered since the audit.

Law enforcement firearms are expected to be properly inventoried and securely guarded. Our assessment of firearms inventory and control for the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO, Office) revealed that overall the internal controls were inadequate to ensure accuracy, accountability, and security of firearms inventories. We found 63 inventory discrepancies out of the 10% of the deputies and detention officers sampled. These discrepancies include:

- Firearms listed on inventories but not present;
- Firearms present but not listed on inventories; and
- Administrative errors such as lost and unprocessed paperwork or data entry errors.

Consequently, the Office cannot accurately account for the number of law enforcement firearms it has or where those firearms are actually located. In fact, the MCSO was terminated in 2014 from the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) 1033 program for “not [having] the required inventory controls or proper management of the weapons they received from the 1033 program in place.”² The 1033 program allows for the transfer of military equipment to local law enforcement agencies at no cost to them. Following an extensive audit conducted internally by the MCSO that began in 2011, eight 45 caliber handguns and one M-16 rifle remained unaccounted for. As a result, the MCSO was terminated from the program for the missing weapons and was required to return all the DoD property that was in the MCSO’s possession.

The MCSO has been relying on an ineffective, inefficient, and outdated process for managing its firearms inventory. A database designed to track training for law enforcement personnel is utilized for recording firearms issued to employees.

¹ “Unaccounted For: Hundreds of Guns Lost or Stolen From Bay Area Police Agencies Since 2010” by Stephen Stock, Michael Bott and Felipe Escamilla, November 16, 2015.

² Letter dated August 19, 2013 from Detective Matt Van Camp, Payson Police Department, 1033 State Coordinator.

Acquisition and disposal of firearms vary depending on the division's operations and structure. Some purchases were delivered to the Range armory and others directly to the division ordering the firearms. The processes used to surrender firearms due to retirement or termination were informal and inconsistent. Some firearms were returned to the Range armory and others to the Training Center or the division firearms custodian.

The MCSO has no standards for the physical security of firearms caches. Although the firearms inventories we observed were secured under some type of access control, the degree of physical security varied greatly. Some were safeguarded by multi-layered security systems as control measures; others had minimal controls leaving them vulnerable to theft.

Our report contains recommendations which, if implemented, should correct deficiencies in firearms management and improve firearms accountability throughout the Office. Adopting a comprehensive quartermaster process of inventory control offers a practical approach to resolving the systemic internal control weaknesses that have impaired the MCSO's ability to properly account for and monitor firearms acquired for Office use. The quartermaster model handles the issuing, managing, and reporting of law enforcement equipment while still keeping it in a centralized location. Tailored law enforcement software, in terms of fulfilling the need for accurate and efficient tracking of inventory, is the strongest method. Archived history can be pulled up at a moment's notice to fulfill any request whether it comes from within the Office or from external sources.

The MCSO already has the necessary infrastructure in place for a quartermaster model of inventory control. In 2009, the MCSO Property Division purchased a software system developed by QueTel Corp. called "Evidence TraQ" for tracking physical and digital evidence. As part of the same QueTel system, the "Quartermaster TraQ" module is designed to manage "inventories of equipment, apparel, and supplies from receipt, through issue, to reorder." (See Attachment A.) Quartermaster TraQ utilizes the same barcode technologies as the Evidence TraQ module, currently used by the Property Division, for enhanced speed and greater accuracy.

With the addition of at least two full-time employees, the Property Division would be ideal to act as the MCSO Quartermaster. The Property Division facility is located next to the Training Center and has the capacity to house the necessary inventory. Each division would assign an employee to act as a firearms coordinator or custodian and be responsible for performing periodic reconciliations with the firearms inventory records of the MCSO Quartermaster.



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Introduction

The Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO, Office) serves Maricopa County, the fourth largest county in the United States at just over 9,200 square miles. The MCSO provides law enforcement services to unincorporated areas of Maricopa County in addition to unincorporated cities within the county that have contracted with the MCSO.

Of its 3,450 employees, the MCSO has 567 sworn deputies (Deputies) and 510 detention officers (Officers) certified to carry firearms. MCSO Deputies and Officers are issued a variety of equipment to properly perform their assigned duties. The firearms carried vary with position and officer status; however, all officers must successfully complete approved training before carrying a firearm on duty.

Firearms are categorized as high-risk “[i]tems that require special attention to protect public safety and avoid potential liability. Some capital-type items by their very nature pose a risk to public safety and could be the source of potential liability (e.g., police weapons).”³ Best practice dictates that care must be taken to ensure that adequate control is maintained over any such items that fall within this category.

To track and account for firearms prior to 2010, the MCSO used a Microsoft (MS) Access database called Weapons Inventory Control System (WICS). Sometime in 2010, WICS was abandoned and MCSO firearms data was entered in an electronic database known as Skills Manager Vista (Skills Manager). Skills Manager's purpose is “for collecting, managing, and reporting development of public safety personnel for the duration of their career.”⁴ Although Skills Manager has a “Weapons Issued” component that should contain data on all firearms issued to employees, firearms inventory management and accountability is not the purpose of Skills Manager. Rather, we found various ad hoc firearms inventory tracking methods being utilized by MCSO divisions.

The MCSO maintains two armories – the Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Division armory administered by the Tactical Operations Unit (TOU) and the Training Division Firearms Training Unit armory located at the Buckeye Hills Shooting Range (Range). These two armories tracked and managed firearms inventories independent of one another and Skills Manager. The Special Investigations Division (SID) is not an armory but tracked its own firearms inventory due to its unique equipment needs and funding sources.

According to the *Firearms Training Section Operational Manual*, June 2006, Section 201.1 Operational Responsibilities, page 5, the Range armory is responsible for controlling, issuing, and maintaining MCSO weapons. The *Manual* refers to an “inventory control form” and a “Firearms Tracking System (FATS)”, neither of which exist. In January 2015, the new MCSO Rangemaster determined that there was no reliable firearms inventory tracking process in place and began tracking armory inventories and firearm qualification activity using a variety of MS Excel spreadsheets. However, the lists maintained by the Range were limited to armory inventories and firearms qualification data and did not take into account all firearms issued and certified prior to January 2015.

The SWAT Division is comprised of three units: Bomb Squad (EOD), Tactical Operation Unit (TOU), and Canine Unit (K-9) with a total of 33 full-time employees (FTEs). SWAT has its own armory separate from the armory located at the Range. SWAT tracks its firearms inventory on a spreadsheet maintained by the firearms custodian. However, it did not maintain an audit trail for firearms that were reassigned to Deputies who were new to the division. In other words, the location of a firearm could be determined at any given point in time but not its history or origin. An electronic equipment inventory record for each Deputy was created in 2015; however, due to administrative staff turnover, this system was not maintained. Physical inventory counts took place periodically, however, not at regular frequency. In addition, reconciliations with the firearms custodian's master inventory list were not performed.

³ Government Finance Officers Association Best Practice, “Maintaining Control over Items that Are Not Capitalized”.

⁴ *Training Division Operations Manual*, Effective date 01/01/2015, Section 105 Definitions, “Skills Manager”, page 7.

Many law enforcement agencies utilize a quartermaster system of asset and inventory control. The Seattle Police Department Manual includes section “9.100 – Department Firearms Management” that documents policies and procedures as it relates to the quartermaster system it has in place. The Quartermaster “[m]aintains a current location and accurate inventory of all Department-owned firearms, from initial possession to final disposition ...” The Property Management Unit of the Anne Arundel County Police Department “...performs the quartermaster functions which involves ordering, stocking, and issuing uniforms and other equipment to the department’s police officers, communications workers, crime scene investigators, crossing guards, reserve officers, volunteers, cadets, and Animal Control personnel.” The quartermaster model of inventory management control offers the advantages of promoting standardization and consistency as well as centralizing accountability while maintaining responsibility at the division level.

Objectives

Our audit objectives were to determine if the MCSO had adequate controls to ensure:

1. Accuracy and completeness of firearms inventory records
2. Accountability for firearms inventory transactions
3. Safeguarding of firearms inventory

Scope

The Bureau of Internal Oversight (BIO) conducted an audit of the management of firearms owned by the MCSO as of September 22, 2015. For the purposes of our audit, we considered Skills Manager the “official” enterprise firearms inventory management system. Our audit did not include an examination of internal control over the functions and activities related to ammunition. The audit was requested by MCSO management.

This report and its recommendations are based on information taken from a sample of transactions and do not represent an examination of all related transactions and activities.

Methodology

Our audit was based on the approach of The Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA) and included a review and analysis of internal control procedures as they related to the MCSO firearms inventory. We utilized several methodologies to achieve the audit objectives. These evidence gathering techniques included, but were not limited to, the following:

- Collecting information and documentation,
- Conducting interviews with appropriate MCSO employees,
- Researching similar audits and best practices,
- Observing facilities and processes,
- Reviewing internal manuals and procedures,
- Performing selected tests and other procedures, and
- Analyzing and evaluating the results of tests performed.

In designing the substantive tests performed, we considered external confirmations the most reliable way to obtain audit evidence. Blank positive confirmation request forms were sent to Deputies and Officers in our samples through the chain of command. 100% of the Firearms Confirmation Requests were returned and exceptions requiring clarification were researched.

The BIO is free from organizational impairments to independence in our reporting as defined by the IIA *International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (Standards)*. We report directly and are accountable to the Operations Command Chief Deputy. Organizationally, we are outside the staff or line

management function of the units that we audit. We report the results of our audits to the Operations Command Chief Deputy and reports are available to the public.

Findings and Recommendations

1. Firearms inventory records were not accurate and complete.

The process for recording firearms into Skills Manager was initiated at the Range. Range staff forwarded documentation to the Training Center by scanning the Firearms Training Record and/or the Armory Receipt to folders by date on a shared drive. (Original Firearms Training Records were later hand-delivered in batches.) The Training Center Administrative staff retrieved documentation from the electronic folders and entered data into Skills Manager.

Firearms Training Record forms were filled out by employees when they completed training classes and/or qualified with weapons. Employees completed Armory Receipt forms when firearms were issued to them. Both forms were completed manually which made it difficult for the Training Center staff to read, causing data entry delays and errors.

Documentation did not always make it to the Training Center for entry into Skills Manager. The process relied on Range staff remembering, or having the capability, to timely scan in necessary documents. In addition, according to Training Center staff, computer system maintenance has caused documents to disappear from the folders.

In the course of our audit, it was discovered that Training Center staff entered firearms data into employee records under “Weapons Issued” from the Firearms Training Records rather than from only Armory Receipt forms. Occasionally, employees qualified with firearms other than those issued to them. For example, there were not enough rifles to be issued to every Deputy and Officer; therefore, many qualified using Range armory rifles. However, firearms data was erroneously entered in employee records as firearms issued to them. This has since been corrected and the Training Center staff now enters data for firearms issued to employees from only Armory Receipt forms.

We also found that one-third of Deputies sampled (18 out of 57) had firearms missing from their employee records as well as firearms incorrectly assigned to them in Skills Manager.

Firearms Not Entered in Skills Manager – Deputies

Twenty-one firearms were not listed in Skills Manager due to three main reasons as illustrated in **Table 1** below.

Table 1


REASON NOT IN SKILLS MANAGER	NO. OF FIREARMS
Document Flow — The Training Division Administrative staff assigned to enter firearms activity data did not receive documentation showing the firearm issued to the Deputy due to human and/or technology error.	7
Special divisions – SWAT and SID — maintained their own databases of firearms activity and did not perform reconciliations with Skills Manager.	13
Historical Data — The Deputy qualified with the firearm prior to the implementation of Skills Manager and had not qualified with it since 2004.	1
	21

The following should be noted:

- Supervisors for Academy Class 135 (29 trainees) failed to submit timely (8 months) firearms packets to be entered into Skills Manager. The information was entered after our test cut-off date of September 22, 2015.
- One SID Deputy was issued a handgun in early 2015 and still had not qualified with it as of October 2015.

As illustrated below in **Chart 1**, over half of the missing firearms were not entered in Skills Manager because the Deputies associated with those firearms were assigned to SWAT or SID. Their firearms inventories were independently managed using MS Excel spreadsheets which were not reconciled with Skills Manager. In addition, special division Deputies had a variety of firearms issued to them due to the nature of their assignment.

Chart 1 - Firearms Missing from Skills Manager



Firearms Incorrectly Entered in Skills Manager – Deputies

There were 37 firearms associated with Deputy employee records in Skills Manager that were not actually issued to 11 Deputies as illustrated in **Table 2** below.⁵


Table 2

REASON INCORRECTLY ENTERED IN SKILLS MANAGER	NO. OF FIREARMS
Document Flow — The Training Division Administrative staff assigned to enter firearms activity data in Skills Manager did not receive documentation showing that the Deputy returned the firearm due to human and/or technology error.	13
Special divisions – SWAT and SID – maintained their own databases of firearms activity and did not perform reconciliations with Skills Manager.	24
	37

⁵ Five of the 11 Deputies in Table 2 were the same Deputies as in Table 1.

As illustrated below in **Chart 2**, over half the firearms were incorrectly associated with employee records in Skills Manager because the Deputies associated with those firearms were assigned to SWAT or SID. Their firearms inventories were independently managed using MS Excel spreadsheets which were not reconciled with Skills Manager. In addition, special division Deputies had a variety of firearms issued to them due to the nature of their assignment.

Chart 2 - Firearms Incorrectly Entered in Skills Manager



Further research revealed that the actual location of 29 of the 37 firearms in **Table 2** could not be determined.

Location	Firearms
Range Armory inventory	3
SWAT Deputies different from those entered in Skills Manager	6
Undetermined	28
	<u>37</u>

Firearms Incorrectly Entered in Skills Manager – Detention Officers (DOs)

Ten percent of the Officers sampled (5 out of 51) had exceptions regarding firearms listed as issued to them in Skills Manager. Each Officer had one firearm listed in their Skills Manager record under “Issued Weapons” but was not actually in their possession as of October 2015 as summarized below.

No. of Firearms/DOs	Cause
3	DOs failed to qualify with handgun; regardless, paperwork was forwarded to Training and incorrectly entered into Skills Manager as an issued weapon.
1	DO qualified with Range armory rifle; however, it was entered into Skills Manager as a weapon issued to him.
1	Handgun was impounded for an incident that occurred October 2014, but Skills Manager showed as issued to DO with no mention as to its actual location.
<u>5</u>	

Recommendation: The MCSO should immediately perform a physical count of all Office-owned firearms to establish a baseline inventory. Periodic inventories should be performed and compared to what is recorded in the inventory system.

The MCSO should develop an effective firearms management process modeled after the quartermaster system. The Quartermaster TraQ module of the QueTel software, as described in Attachment A, utilizes a barcode system which eliminates the need for manual forms currently completed at the Range as it relates to firearms. It also eliminates the need for Training Center staff to enter weapon-related data, allowing for greater efficiency and accuracy.

Division Response: The Training Division concurs with this finding. The Training Division has begun work on performing a new firearms and Taser inventory. This inventory will be mandatory for all Deputy Sheriffs and Detention Officers and be accomplished through the ELearning process.

The Training Division is evaluating the inventory ability of the Cornerstone Talent Management System software developed by Cornerstone OnDemand and has an anticipated roll-out of July 1, 2016. The Training Division is confident that this software will meet the inventory challenge.

***BIO Comments:** Care must be taken when considering an employee learning tracking software system rather than quartermaster software for enterprise asset management. According to Exhibit B—Scope of Work attached to the contract between Cornerstone OnDemand, Inc. and Maricopa County, the intent is “[t]o provide the Maricopa County Human Resources Office with a fully integrated Cornerstone Talent Management System including Learning Management System (LMS) with the ability to integrate Performance Management functionality the following fiscal year.” The Training Division should carefully evaluate whether the Cornerstone software system has the capability to fully address the risks identified in this audit report.*

2. Controls over acquisition, retention, and disposal of firearms were weak.

There were no standard Office-wide processes for delivery and taking possession of firearms, diversion of firearms for MCSO use, or for surrendering MCSO-owned firearms due to separation of service or reassignment of duties.

Purchases

Firearms purchasing was centralized through the MCSO Procurement and Finance Divisions; however, firearms were delivered directly to the MCSO program making the request.

- During fiscal years ended June 30, 2014 and 2015, the Range ordered several hundred pistols and rifles under the MCSO contract with Smith & Wesson (S&W); according to the invoices, all were delivered to the Range in Buckeye.
- In September 2014, the MCSO Court Security Division ordered three S&W M&P 15 rifles which were delivered directly to the South Court Tower of the Maricopa County Superior Court.
- Firearms ordered by SWAT and SID were delivered directly to their office locations.

No entries were made in Skills Manager to reflect purchased firearms until Deputies and Officers were issued and/or had qualified with these firearms.

Returns

When retiring or separating from service, an employee surrendered all Office-issued firearms to the Range, the Training Center, or their division’s firearms custodian.

- If the firearm was returned to the Range, the original Armory Receipt was pulled from the individual's file, dated and initialed by the Armorer. The form was then scanned and forwarded to Training Center staff for entry into Skills Manager.
- If the firearm was returned to the Training Center, the "Employment Release Form – Property Returns" form was completed. No reconciliation with firearms listed for the individual in Skills Manager was performed. In addition, intake was not necessarily performed by weapons-certified staff.
- If the firearm was returned to SWAT or SID, a notation was made to the spreadsheet maintained by the division firearms custodian; however, there was no communication with Skills Manager.

Diversions

An audit dated July 2015 conducted by the Maricopa County Internal Audit Department indicated that "[i]ndustry standards recommend that diversion of property and evidence for department use is appropriate if the item would otherwise be destroyed or auctioned." However, the MCSO had "not established a process to ensure firearms and other valuable equipment are added to inventory listings once diverted, as recommended by industry standards."⁶

We observed that Skills Manager indicated "Diverted" in some employee records; however, Training Center staff could not tell us the process, if any, for accounting for diverted firearms in Skills Manager or how the "Diverted" notations got there.

Weak internal accountability measures allow loss or misuse, theft, and misappropriation of firearms. Documentation of transactions involving firearms establishes an audit trail and enhances controls. To enhance the accountability functions of Maricopa County, the Maricopa County *Capital Asset Manual* (Revised 5/2004), page 7, highly recommends that "high-theft items" such as firearms be accounted for and controlled by developing and maintaining a detailed Departmental Inventory Control List "to reconcile the actual presence or absence of equipment on a regular basis," page 4.

Recommendation: MCSO should develop processes to centralize the purchase, distribution, diversion, and surrender of firearms by establishing and including the role of the MCSO Quartermaster. Firearms inventory should be accounted for and controlled by developing and maintaining a "Departmental Inventory Control List" which is reconciled with the physical firearms inventory count. A listing of firearms inventory can easily be maintained and accessed by utilizing a software system such as QueTel's Quartermaster TraQ as described in Attachment A.

Division Response: The Training Division concurs with this finding. This is a far reaching project with Office-wide implications. The MCSO quartermaster program would be an excellent solution to the recommendations herein. Previous discussions have taken place with the Property and Evidence Division leadership. The Property and Evidence building would meet these needs by providing a secure and central location. This is a great idea; the obstacle would be providing staffing for the new quartermaster section for Property and Evidence. It is agreed that all weapon system purchases be funneled through the MCSO Quartermaster for inventory control.

3. There were no physical security standards for armories.

Despite the inherent dangers of firearms, the MCSO had not established specific security standards for their storage. While the firearms caches we observed were stored in a gun safe or had a similar type of controlled access, the level of physical security of those storage areas varied greatly. At a minimum, all firearms storage areas were restricted from public access.

⁶ "Issue #5: Property and Evidence Division – Diverting Property for MCSO Use", *Sheriff's Office Management of Property and Evidence, Records, Cash, and Information Technology*, page 9.

The Range armory used a multi-layered security system and stored firearms in a room similar to a bank vault. There were two smaller safes inside the vault containing inventory needing further security and segregation such as revolvers and fully automatic firearms. The building was protected by an intrusion detection alarm system and a closed circuit television (CCTV) surveillance camera system (recordings were retained for 2 years). Additional security was provided by a key pad at the property entrance and a card access system.

The SWAT TOU armory was a secured room containing two safes. All SWAT personnel had access to the room itself where they could clean their firearms and perform minor repairs; however, access to the gun safes was restricted to a few authorized personnel. The K-9 Unit maintained a small safe outside of the TOU armory.

Vault-like doors containing combination locks along with electronic access control devices were used to control access to firearms storage areas. However, the firearms custodians for both armories indicated that safe combinations were not changed when employees with knowledge of the combinations leave the divisions. This weakness leaves firearms vulnerable to theft if access cards are lost or stolen despite the thoroughness of current access controls.

In 2013, the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO) updated its *Internal Control – Integrated Framework* to include safeguarding assets in the definition of “Operations Objective”. Best practice for safeguarding assets from loss dictates that safe combinations should be changed whenever security is compromised or knowledgeable employees leave.

Recommendation: The MCSO should develop written minimum physical security standards for firearms caches throughout the Office, including armories. Changing safe combinations when employees with knowledge of combinations leave the divisions should be required.

Division Response: The Training Division concurs with this finding. This is a multi-divisional/bureau issue. The Range has delineated security standards in their Standard Operating Procedures; however, the Standard Operating Procedures is currently under revision. In addition, talks have been underway about the potential benefits of moving the un-issued firearms from the Range armory to the Property and Evidence facility. This would create a higher degree of security.

Arrangements are being made through Facilities Management to change the combination of the vault and should be completed soon. The Range Standard Operating Procedures will be updated to include changing vault combinations on a regular basis or as deemed necessary.

Summary of Recommendations

- The MCSO should immediately perform a physical count of all Office-owned firearms to establish a baseline inventory. Periodic inventories should be performed and compared to what is recorded in the inventory system.
- The MCSO should develop an effective firearms management process modeled after the quartermaster system. The Quartermaster TraQ module of the QueTel software, as described in Attachment A, utilizes a barcode system which eliminates the need for manual forms currently completed at the Range as it relates to firearms. It also eliminates the need for Training Center staff to enter weapon-related data, allowing for greater efficiency and accuracy.
- The MCSO should develop processes to centralize the purchase, distribution, diversion, and surrender of firearms by establishing and including the role of the MCSO Quartermaster.
- Firearms inventory should be accounted for and controlled by developing and maintaining a “Departmental Inventory Control List” which is reconciled with the physical firearms inventory count. A listing of firearms inventory can easily be maintained and accessed by utilizing a software system such as QueTel’s Quartermaster TraQ as described in Attachment A.
- The MCSO should develop written minimum physical security standards for firearms caches throughout the Office, including armories.
- Changing safe combinations when employees with knowledge of combinations leave the divisions should be required.

The A to Z Materiel Management: Quartermaster TraQ

Quartermaster TraQ is designed to meet the special needs of uniformed services to manage all material used to deliver services in their jurisdictions. It consists of a core system designed to provide the basic operating and management accountability functions, plus a wide range of optional enhancements to save time, eliminate paperwork, and enhance and simplify accountability. Quartermaster TraQ provides *central accountability* for all items received and issued, but it allows *decentralized control* for stocking and issuing items by different units within the agency, e.g. stockroom, academy, range, garage, and IT.

Distinguishing Quartermaster TraQ

Many asset systems and stockroom/warehouse inventory systems masquerade as quartermaster systems. There are a myriad of asset systems on the market. Simple asset systems are so easy to build that one of our developers once created one in Access in 15 minutes. They account for equipment, but seldom, if ever, do they venture into expendable supplies, much less tracking apparel and other reusable items.

Stockroom or warehouse inventory systems are nearly as prevalent as asset systems. They manage shelf stock levels as items are ordered, received, and issued. Where they are lacking is tracing who has items after issue or where they are located. Most fail to track sensitive equipment, such as weapons and PCs, at receiving in order to establish cradle-to-grave accountability.

What differentiates the Quartermaster TraQ is that it *accounts for and controls all material* used by uniformed services agencies. It helps manage serialized equipment, apparel, and supplies from draft requisition and receipt, stocking on shelves, through issue to users, and to final disposition. It tracks who is responsible for each item of equipment and provides an audit history of moves and changes. It tracks reusable items and apparel issued to employees, for which they are accountable at termination.

It records supplies issued to different units, as well as who picked the items up, in order to help in budgeting as well as accountability. Optional modules can allow clients to manage maintenance schedules; vehicle fueling; and equipment inspections and calibration, in addition to emergency repairs. And, it can manage sets of items (configurations), including electronic and other complex hardware, machinery, and the contents of vehicles.

Quartermaster TraQ—Core Capabilities

True to the basic functions of any quartermaster system, Quartermaster TraQ begins with managing shelf inventories of equipment, apparel, and supplies from receipt, through issue, to reorder; and in today's world, employing barcode technologies for enhanced speed and greater accuracy. Users should be able to take barcode inventories of shelves, run exceptions reports, and correct on-hand balances based on the first two steps. The system can track shelf stock in locations that stock various types of items in addition to those in the central stock room, e.g. the range, IT/communications.

After issue, authorized persons can trace accountability for the use of material holding employees responsible for items of value (equipment and reusable apparel items) and accounting for the consumption of expendable supplies and forms. Not only does the system alert users to low shelf stock levels, but it also alerts them usage (vests) and warranty expiration dates.

Two mouse clicks and an authorized user can view what the employee is accountable for returning. The user can also see an audit trail of everything an employee has had including items that have been returned and are no longer “charged” to his or her account. With the same ease the system displays reports of supplies usage, vendor deliveries, listings of who has a particular type of equipment, and much more information.

The ad hoc query and reporting capability provides the ability to find and list serialized items using any field or fields in the database as search criteria. Quartermaster TraQ keeps a complete history of each item of equipment from receipt to disposition.

Enhanced Capabilities

Quartermaster TraQ’s core capabilities can be extended in several dimensions to help solve problems that agencies face in using equipment. In the outlined bullets below we identify issues or problems that many agencies face and QueTel’s solution to address each issue.

Issue: How we track equipment and vehicles checked out and back each shift?

Solution: Pooled equipment module

Issue: Can we use the system to track equipment used in our office locations?

Solution: Departmental equipment module

Issue: How can we prove issue to an employee, if s/he disputes that it was issued?

Solution: Signature capture pad attached to the PC and/or in the mobile scanner

Issue: It’s hard to check out items to new recruits or sets of items for a promoted employee

Solution: Use the kit module to issue a standard set of items with one barcode

Issue: How can I keep track of the equipment in a vehicle?

Solution: The vessel module treats the vehicle and its contents as one unit

Issue: Districts and special units want to order items for quick pick up or delivery

Solution: Amazon like cart to order for pick up or delivery module

Issue: We want to track the cost of repairs on a vehicle

Solution: Emergency repair recording and reporting module

Issue: How do I record and keep track of inspections, calibration, and preventive maintenance?

Solution: Inspection/Calibration module

Issue: We have required forms we need to use for some operations

Solution: QueTel can create custom forms

Issue: We use a commercial vendor for uniforms, but we want to pre-approve items supplied.

Solution: Non-stock item accountability option

Issue: We would like to keep images of items and damage that may have occurred to them.
Solution: Image attachment module for products and individual assets

Issue: Our management wants regular statistical reports of activity
Solution: Ad hoc management statistics report writer
Solution: Graphical display of quartermaster statistics in the executive dashboard

Issue: How do we track how many discretionary items an employee is allowed each year?
Solution: Points management module

Issue: How can I get data from my spreadsheets/legacy database into Quartermaster TraQ?
Solution: Data conversion module

Issue: We have Active Directory Authentication. Is the system compatible?
Solution: We can integrate Quartermaster TraQ with Active Directory

Issue: It takes too long at receiving to record item barcodes and serial numbers one by one
Solution: Bulk intake option



MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE
TRAINING DIVISION
CORRECTIVE ACTION PLAN
FIREARMS AUDIT #A2015-0060



Prepared by: Director Nick Larkin

Finding/ Recommendation	Responsible Staff	Corrective Action	Completion Date		Status
			Estimated	Actual	
<p>1. Firearms inventory records were not accurate and complete. The MCSO should immediately perform a physical count of all Office-owned firearms to establish a baseline inventory. Periodic inventories should be performed and compared to what is recorded in the inventory system.</p> <p>The MCSO should develop an effective firearms management process modeled after the quartermaster system.</p>	NL	The Training Division has begun work on a new firearms and Taser inventory. This inventory will be mandatory for all Deputy Sheriffs and Detention Officers. This will be accomplished through the ELearning process.	02/05/16	02/05/16	Completed
	NL	The Training Division is evaluating the inventory ability of the Cornerstone software. Cornerstone has an anticipated roll out of 7-01-16, we are confident that this software will meet the inventory challenge.	01/15/17		Pending
<p>2. Controls over acquisition, retention, and disposal of firearms were weak. MCSO should develop processes to centralize the purchase, distribution, diversion, and surrender of firearms by establishing and including the role of the MCSO Quartermaster.</p> <p>Firearms inventory should be accounted for and controlled by developing and maintaining a "Departmental Inventory Control List" which is reconciled with the physical firearms inventory count.</p>	NL	This is a far reaching project with office wide implications. The MCSO quartermaster program would be an excellent solution to the recommendations herein. Previous discussions have been had with the Property and Evidence Division leadership. The property and evidence facility would meet these needs, providing a secure and central location.	01/01/17		Pending
	NL	All weapon system purchases should be funneled through the quartermaster for inventory control. The same will hold true for the equipment return process when an employee separates, including firearms.	01/01/17		Pending

Finding/ Recommendation	Responsible Staff	Corrective Action	Completed Date		Status
			Estimated	Actual	
<p>3. There were no physical security standards for armories. The MCSO should develop written minimum physical security standards for firearms caches throughout the Office, including armories.</p> <p>Changing safe combinations when employees with knowledge of combinations leave the divisions should be required.</p>	NL	This is a multi-divisional/ bureau issue. The Sheriffs range has delineated security standards in their Standard Operating Procedures; however, the Standard Operating Procedure is currently under revision. In addition talks have been underway about the potential benefits of moving the un-issued firearms from the MCSO firing range to the Property and Evidence facility. This would create a higher degree of security. Development of an armory security and satellite weapon storage areas policy and procedure is in the development stage.	08/01/16		Pending
	NL	A purchase order is being created with a qualified vendor to get the combination changed on an as needed basis. The range SOP will be modified to ensure this action is adhered to.	03/01/16		Pending